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Abstract. The amount of data created, stored, and processed has enor-
mously increased in the last years. Today, millions of devices are con-
nected to the Internet and generate a huge amount of (personal) data
that need to be stored and processed using scalable, e cient, and reliable
computing infrastructures. Cloud computing technology can be used to
respond to these needs. Although cloud computing brings many benefits
to users and companies, security concerns about the cloud still represent
the major impediment for its wide adoption.
We briefly survey the main challenges related to the storage and pro-
cessing of data in the cloud. In particular, we focus on the problem
of protecting data in storage, supporting fine-grained access, selectively
sharing data, protecting query privacy, and verifying the integrity of
computations.
1 Introduction
The wide use and advancements of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICTs) have profoundly changed our lives. The proliferation of any kind of
smart devices that can easily connect to the Internet together with the avail-
ability of (almost free) wireless connections anywhere have led to a more dis-
tributed computing environment, which is expected to grow in the near future.
The huge amount of data coming from these devices, which must be rapidly
stored and processed, introduces the need of developing scalable, e cient, and
reliable computing infrastructures. Cloud computing is a collection of technolo-
gies and services that provides an answer to these needs, making virtually un-
limited storage space and computing power available at a↵ordable prices. Users
and companies can therefore store their data at external cloud providers, ac-
cess reliable and e cient services provided by third parties, and use computing
power available in multiple locations across the network. Although the use of
cloud computing has clear economic advantages, the collection, storage, pro-
cessing, and sharing of (often personal) data in the cloud pose several security
concerns (e.g., [25,32,33,34,35,43,44]). In particular, when data are moved to the
cloud, the data owner loses control over them and often even knows neither the
location where the data are stored nor the organizations responsible for their
management.
It is important to observe that the protection of data is a key aspect not
only for the success of today’s cloud infrastructures but also for the proper de-
velopment of applications in emerging areas such as Internet of Things and Big
Data analytics, which are characterized by huge amounts of data that need to be
shared and processed by di↵erent parties. In addition to data privacy, another
important concern is the security and privacy of the data processing that may
involve di↵erent parties with the need of sharing information and performing
distributed computations. Ensuring that the data processing is carried out se-
curely is a significant challenge. The goal of this paper is to provide an overview
of the data protection challenges that need to be addressed when using the cloud
to store and process data, and to illustrate existing proposals addressing them.
In particular, we focus on the problem of protecting data in storage while sup-
porting fine-grained access, selectively sharing data among di↵erent users/data
owners, supporting query privacy, and verifying the integrity of data computa-
tions.
2 Protection of data in storage and fine-grained access
A well-known problem that characterizes the use of a cloud infrastructure is the
loss of control over data. A data owner storing her data in the cloud often knows
neither where her data are stored nor the organizations involved in their man-
agement. Encryption services are therefore at the basis of current solutions for
protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the data from malicious users and
from the providers themselves (e.g., [7,25,43]). Encryption can be applied both at
the server side or at the owner side. In the first case, data owners have full trust
in the cloud provider managing their data (e.g., Google Cloud Storage, iCloud),
which has full access to their data, and can enjoy full functionality. In the sec-
ond case, the data are encrypted before outsourcing them to a cloud provider
(e.g., Boxcryptor, SpiderOak), and data owners can enjoy protection but lim-
ited functionality. In fact, the cloud provider cannot access the data it stores in
plaintext, and hence cannot directly evaluate queries or execute computations,
because they would require operating on encrypted data. Current approaches
enabling the execution of queries on encrypted data are based on: the use of
specific cryptographic techniques supporting keyword-based searches (e.g., [8]);
homomorphic encryption supporting any operation but with high performance
overhead (e.g., [29]); di↵erent layers of encryption each supporting specific op-
erations [40]; or indexes, that is, metadata attached to the data and used for
fine-grained information retrieval and execution of specific queries, depending
on the kind of index (e.g., [9,31,46]).
Although all these approaches provide the capability of evaluating queries
on encrypted data, they make query evaluation more expensive or not always
possible. To avoid this problem, alternative solutions to encryption use data frag-
mentation to protect data confidentiality. Data fragmentation is based on the
observation that often data are not sensitive per se but the association among
data is sensitive and needs to be protected. For instance, while a list of names
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and a list of illnesses are not sensitive, the association of each name in the first
list with the illness from which she su↵ers in the second list needs to be kept
confidential. In this case, encrypting both names and illnesses may not be neces-
sary. Data fragmentation comes at this point: the use of encryption is limited or
avoided by splitting data in di↵erent fragments (e.g., [1,10,11,12,15]). Fragments
are computed in such a way that sensitive associations, called confidentiality con-
straints , are broken. To guarantee that sensitive associations cannot be recon-
structed, fragments are designed in such a way to guarantee their unlinkability
or are stored at di↵erent cloud providers.
Besides protecting data confidentiality and integrity, attention has been also
dedicated to solutions aimed at proving to remote parties guarantees that the
management of data by a cloud provider complies with the service level agree-
ment, guaranteeing their availability (e.g., [6,36]).
3 Selective information sharing
The proposals aimed at protecting the confidentiality of the data in the cloud
are typically based on the implicit assumption that any authorized user can ac-
cess the whole data content. This assumption, however, is in contrast with the
nature of today’s open and dynamic scenarios, where di↵erent users might need
to have di↵erent views on the outsourced data (e.g., [2,18]). Since neither the
cloud provider storing the data nor the data owner can enforce the access control
policy for confidentiality and e ciency reasons, respectively, existing solutions
are based on the use of attribute-based encryption (ABE) and selective encryp-
tion techniques. ABE is a public-key encryption schema that regulates access to
resources on the basis of policies defined on descriptive attributes associated with
users [30,48]. ABE-based approaches have been recently widely investigated, and
several solutions have been proposed for improving the support of policy updates
(e.g., [28,42]). Selective encryption is based on the idea that di↵erent resources
are encrypted with di↵erent keys and that a key derivation strategy (e.g., [5]),
which relies on the definition of a key derivation hierarchy , is adopted to trans-
late read access privileges into the ability of users to derive the encryption keys
used to protect the data they are authorized to access [19,20]. To easily support
changes to the access control policy on a resource (i.e., grant/revoke operations)
without downloading the resource, decrypting it, changing the key derivation
hierarchy, and re-encrypting the resource with the new key, two layers of en-
cryption (each characterized by its own encryption policy) are used. One layer
is managed by the data owner, while the other is managed directly by the cloud
provider and access to data is granted to users who know the encryption keys of
both the layers. Therefore, the management of grant and revoke operations can
be partially delegated to the cloud provider storing the data.
Few works have also extended the selective encryption techniques to enforce
write privileges (e.g., [14,41,42]), to support the presence of multiple data owners
selectively sharing their data among each other (e.g., [17]), and to support the
release of data according to a subscription-based policy [13].
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4 Query privacy
Several e↵orts have been dedicated to the development of e cient techniques
for protecting access confidentiality and pattern confidentiality . Access confiden-
tiality means that an observer (including the cloud provider storing the data)
should not be able to infer the target of an access singularly taken. Pattern confi-
dentiality means that an observer should not be able to infer whether the target
of two di↵erent accesses is the same. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) tech-
niques have been traditionally used to provide both these protection guarantees
but they are computationally expensive and operate on plaintext data, therefore
not protecting data confidentiality. Recent alternative solutions enhance existing
index structures (e.g., B+-trees and Oblivious RAM [9,26,49]) to protect confi-
dentiality of data, accesses, and patterns thereof. However, these solutions, while
more e cient than PIR approaches, cause an overhead in access times (either for
each access or when triggering expensive reordering of the underlying data struc-
ture), which make them not always applicable in real-life scenarios. Dynamically
allocated data structures (e.g., [22,23,24,45,51]) represent a di↵erent approach
to provide data, access, and pattern confidentiality, while guaranteeing a limited
overhead in query evaluation and supporting concurrent accesses to the data.
The basic idea of these solutions consists in moving the physical location where
data are stored after each access (without leaving traces of such reallocations)
so that an observer cannot make any inference on the data accessed.
5 Integrity of computations
When data are elaborated by cloud providers that are not fully trustworthy,
there is the problem of verifying the integrity of such a computation, that is,
verifying whether the result is correct , complete, and fresh. A result is: cor-
rect if the computation involves only genuine data; complete if the computation
has been performed on the whole data collection and includes all resources sat-
isfying the computation; fresh if the computation has been performed on the
most recent version of the data. At a high level, existing solutions addressing
this problem can be divided into two main classes: deterministic and probabilis-
tic. Deterministic approaches are based on the definition of authenticated data
structures, which are structures built over specific attributes (e.g., Merkle hash
trees or signature chaining schemas [38,39]). A user submits a query to a cloud
provider that executes it and returns the query result along with the information
necessary for the user to verify the correctness and completeness of the query
result. Such an information, called verification object , is computed with the help
of an authenticated data structure. These techniques provide deterministic in-
tegrity guarantees but only for queries with conditions on the attribute(s) on
which the data structure has been built. Probabilistic approaches complement
the data with fictitious information or checks whose absence in a query result
signals an integrity violation (e.g., [21,47,50]). Probabilistic approaches can de-
tect an integrity violation for any query but with only probabilistic guarantees.
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This means that while the absence of the expected fictitious information im-
plies an integrity violation, their presence does not provide full guarantees of
the integrity of the query result (the cloud provider might have just not missed
the fictitious information inserted by the data owner). The possible presence of
multiple providers in the computation complicates the scenario and requires the
use of additional controls (e.g., [16]).
6 Conclusions
The adoption of cloud technologies to store and process huge amount of data,
while bringing many benefits, also introduces novel security risks on the data.
In this paper, we described challenges related to the management of data in the
cloud, and described current solutions.
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